Supreme Court, U. S.
FILED
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MICHAEL RODAK, JR., CLERK

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1980

NO. 80-528

CHARLES J. SAVARESE, JR.

Petitioner,

vs.

PATRICIA ROBERTS HARRIS,
SECRETARY OF HEALTH and HUMAN SERVICES

Respondent.

SUPPLEMENTAL APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

(Opinion of the
United States District Court
For the Northern District of Georgia
Atlanta Division

WILLIAM M. BOWEN
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P.O. Drawer 5608
Hilton Head Island, South Carolina 29928

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION

CHARLES J. SAVARESE, JR.	:	
	:	
vs.	:	CIVIL ACTION NO.
	:	C78-243A
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE and GEORGE A. REICH	:	

ORDER

This action brought pursuant to the public information provisions of the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. Section 552a et seq., and the law of defamation is before the court on both plaintiff's and defendants' motions for summary judgment. Plaintiff alleges that certain information contained in the records of the United States Public Health Service of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare is "inaccurate, incomplete, false and misleading." Plaintiff further alleges that he has requested that the records in

question be reviewed and amended so as to correct the alleged inaccuracies and that defendants have refused to comply with his request. Plaintiff not only seeks to have the alleged inaccuracies corrected pursuant to 5 U.S.C. Section 552a(g)(1)(A) but also seeks damages pursuant to 5 U.S.C. Section 552a(g)(4). Finally, plaintiff states a pendent claim under the law of defamation.

In 1976 plaintiff in this action was a commissioned officer in the United States Public Health Service of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare. In July of that year plaintiff was stationed at Beaufort-Jasper Comprehensive Health Service, Inc. in South Carolina. While plaintiff was stationed in South Carolina some disagreement arose between plaintiff and his superiors concerning alleged absences by plaintiff from his duty station. Defendant Reich, acting as Regional Health Administra-

tor for Region IV of the Public Health Service and as plaintiff's superior officer, made some attempts to remedy whatever misunderstandings had occurred. During July plaintiff agreed to a transfer from the Beaufort-Jasper clinic to a public health facility in Tchula, Mississippi. Defendants contend that plaintiff absented himself without leave from the Beaufort-Jasper clinic prior to receiving transfer orders to proceed to Mississippi. A declaration to that effect is contained in the central records of the Public Health Service in Rockville, Maryland. Plaintiff's absence without leave status was removed upon his arrival in Mississippi. Plaintiff contends that at no time was he absent without leave and seeks correction of the records in question.

In May of 1977 the Public Health Service issued orders relieving plaintiff of his duties and terminating his appointment as a commissioned officer in the Public Health Service.

Subsequent to plaintiff's termination, defendant Reich was contacted by representative of the Department of Family Medicine of East Carolina Medical School. During one telephone conversation Dr. Reich indicated a negative experience regarding the plaintiff's obedience to rules and regulations. Dr. Reich also indicated that there had been prolonged problems with plaintiff's employment and that at one time he had been absent without leave. This report was formalized in a letter from defendant Reich to the Chairman of the Department of Family Medicine at East Carolina Medical School. In that letter defendant Reich confirmed his recommendation that plaintiff not be hired and again indicated that plaintiff was absent without leave on at least one occasion. The telephone conversations as well as the letter form the basis of plaintiff's claim for damages under the Privacy Act and for defamation.

Section 552a(d) of the Act states in part that

> (e)ach agency that maintains a system of records shall--
>
> ....
>
> (2) permit the individual to request amendment of a record pertaining to him and--
>
> ....
>
> (B) promtly, either--
>
> (i) make any correction of any portion thereof which the individual believes is not accurate, relevant, timely, or complete; or
>
> (ii) inform the individual of its refusal to amend the record in accordance with his request
>
> ....

The agency is not required to place information into its records simply because the subject in question requests such action, and neither is the agency required to remove information from its records upon request. The agency is, however, required to

> maintain all records which are used by the agency in making any determination about any individual with such accuracy, relevance, timeliness, and completeness as is reasonably necessary to assure fairness to the individual in the determination ....

5 U.S.C. Section 552a(e)(5). This test of reasonableness has been applied by the courts

in cases such as the present one, so that if the court determines that the agency has done what is reasonable in assuring the accuracy of the information included, no more is required. See Smiertka v. U.S. Department of Treasury, 447 F. Supp. 221, 226 n.35 (D.D.C. 1978), remanded on other grounds, No. 78-1477 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 7, 1979).

Defendant seeks to establish through a great deal of evidence that it acted reasonably in placing information in plaintiff's file concerning poor job performance and the circumstances of an incident in which plaintiff was allegedly absent without leave. In opposition to defendants' motion for summary judgment on this ground, plaintiff points to a portion of an exhibit to defendants' answers to interrogatories. Said exhibit is a copy of a letter from plaintiff to defendants. In that communication plaintiff sets out in detail the basis for his claim that the records involved contain false information which should be changed.

This letter and the details set out therein materially contradict defendants' version of the facts and, if proven, a factual basis for relief may be shown. Clearly, however, there is a factual dispute not only as to whether the information in the report is true but, more importantly, whether the agency's determination was made reasonably so as to assure fairness to the plaintiff. See 5 U.S.C. Section 552a(e)(5). Factual issues concerning reasonableness are not easily disposed of on summary judgment, and where, as here, the facts are clearly in dispute, summary judgment is particularly inappropariate. Accordingly, defendants' motion for summary judgment as to count I is hereby denied. Plainiff's motion for summary judgment does not address count I.

Plaintiff alleges in count II that defendant Reich, having access to agency records, did unlawfully disseminate information contained therein. Both plaintiff and defendants have

moved for summary judgment as to count two. Section 552a(b) of Title 5 of the United States Code forbids disclosure of

> any record which is contained in a system of records by any means of communication to any person, or to another agency, except pursuant to a written request by, or with the prior written consent of, the individual to whom the record pertains....

There are, in addition, eleven exceptions to this rule. The defendants do not contend that any of those exceptions apply in this case. Instead, defendants contend that the information disclosed was not in a "system of records" as defined by the Act and the information disclosed was based on independent knowledge and not agency files. A "system of records" as defined by the Act consists of any group of agency records

> under the control of any agency from which information is retrieved by the name of the individual or by some identifying number, symbol, or other identifying particular assigned to the individual ....

5 U.S.C. Section 552a(a)(5). Defendant contends that the information disclosed was contained

only in the general correspondence and program files which are not keyed for retrieval by means of names or name-related identifiers; hence, there being no "system of records," defendant contends that the disclosure prohibitions do not apply. Defendant shows that Dr. Reich's "program file" is a general file relating to the Public Health Service' regional activities in general, and the plaintiff agrees that it is not a "system of records" within the meaning of the Privacy Act. It is undisputed that the program files are not keyed for retrieval by name or name-related identifiers. As to the correspondence file, plaintiff's supervisor, Dr. Reich, states that his "reading file" is maintained only by sequential dates of the letters therein. He also states that if plaintiff requested documents therein, the only manner of retrieval would be a manual search of the entire file. Clearly, then, that file is not keyed to retrieval by names or identifiers. Under defen-

dant's undisputed evidence, therefore, neither the "reading file" nor the "program file" are systems of records under the Privacy Act's definitions.

It is evident from the matters before the court that at least a portion of the information which Dr. Reich communicated to third persons was contained in a system of records at the central office of the Public Health Service in Rockville, Maryland. The uncontradicted evidence shows, however, that Dr. Reich at no time referred to or otherwise utilized information retrieved from that system of records. Instead, the contents of Dr. Reich's communications were based on knowledge obtained from other Public Health Service employees working with plaintiff. As plaintiff's commanding officer, it was Dr. Reich's duty to review, evaluate, and assist personnel under his command. It is true that the information pertinent to this action which was contained in the Public Health Service's system of re-

cords in Maryland emanated from Dr. Reich's command; however, the converse is not true. The information which Dr. Reich communicated was not disclosed from the system of records in Maryland.

Again, the pertinent section of the Privacy Act states that

> (n)o agency shall disclose any record which is contained in a system of records by any means of communication to any person....

5 U.S.C. Section 552a(b). It is plaintiff's contention that because the information which Dr. Reich disclosed was in a system of records in the agency, the information could not be disclosed without permission. Although the language of the Act is not a model of clarity or precision, the court finds such an interpretation to be implausible.

Under plaintiff's view no government employee could utter a single word concerning any person without first reviewing all systems of records within the agency to determine whether or not

the information in question was contained therein. In day-to-day operations of the federal government, officials are appropriately called on to make numerous statments concerning persons who may have information concerning them contained in a system of records somewhere within the agency. It borders on the absurd to contend that all officials should have a pansophic recall concerning every record within every system of records within the agency. By ways of example only should Dr. Reich inform a prospective employer that a Public Health Service employee was an outstanding worker and had never missed a day at work, it is certainly conceivable that such information could, to Dr. Reich's knowledge, be contained in a system of records within the agency, even though Dr. Reich had never seen such records. Under plaintiff's interpretation of the Act, if that information was intentionally disclosed, the United States could be liable

for a minimum of $1,000.

Instead, the court finds, after consideration of the Act's stated purpose, that for a disclosure to be covered by section 552a(b), there must have initially been a retrieval from the system of records which was at some point a source of the information. The court's interpretation is also supported by the stated congressional findings concerning the Privacy Act. In pertinent part those findings state that

> (1) the privacy of an individaul is directly affected by the collection, maintenance, use, and dissemination of personal information by Federal agencies;
>
> (2) the increasing use of computers and sophisticated information technology, while essential to the efficient operations of the Government, has greatly magnified the harm to individual privacy that can occur from any collection, maintenance, use, or dissemination of personal information;
>
> (3) the opportunitites for an individual to secure employment, insurance, and credit, and his right to due process, and other legal protections are endangered by the misuse of certain information systems....

Pub. L.No. 93-579, Section 2, 88 Stat. 1896.

As the above-quoted findings clearly indicate, Congress had as its purpose the control of the unbridled use of highly sophisticated and centralized information collecting technology. The capacity of computers and related systems to collect and distribute great masses of personal information clearly poses a threat that the Privacy Act seeks to remedy. That problem is not, however, present in this action. On the contrary, there was no utilization whatsoever of such an information system to retrieve the information at issue in this case. It may have been in such a system, but the uncontradicted evidence shows that no retrieval or disclosure from such a system was present.

As the above shows, this case presents a fairly clear-cut situation. The commanding officer through communication with his subordinates in region was provided with certain information concerning plaintiff. That information simply did not emanate from the central information and record center in Maryland. There will certainly

be cases where it will be difficult to determine whether certain information disclosures in fact originated from a system of records; however, the undisputed facts in this case show that no such system was utilized. Dr. Reich was not the custodian of the system of records and in fact had no knowledge of its precise contents. Accordingly, and for the above-stated reasons, the court hereby grants defendants' motion for summary judgment as to count II and denies plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, which addresses only count II.

Defendants also move for summary judgment as to count III. That count alleges a pendent state claim aginst Dr. Reich for defamation. Defendants base their summary judgment motion on the ground that Dr. Reich, acting within the scope of his official duties, is entitled to immunity from personal liability in a civil tort suit. See Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959); Granger v. Marek, 583 F. 2d 781 (6th Cir. 1978). In that defendant Reich's motion

as to count III appears meritorious and because plaintiff has not opposed said motion as to count III, the court finds that summary judgment for defendant should be and hereby is granted as to count III. Since count I is not addressed to defendant Reich, there is no claim pending as to him. Because there appears no just reason for delay, the court, pursuant to rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, hereby directs the clerk to enter judgment for defendant Reich.

As stated above, defendants' motion for summary judgment as to count II is granted and as to count I is denied. Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is denied. The clerk is directed to place this matter on the trial calendar at the earliest practicable date.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 27th day of September, 1979.

s/
WILLIAM C. O'KELLEY
United States District
Judge

Supreme Court, U. S.
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OCTOBER TERM, 1980

CHARLES J. SAVARESE, JR., PETITIONER

v.

PATRICIA ROBERTS HARRIS,
SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENT IN OPPOSITION

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In the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1980

No. 80-528

CHARLES J. SAVARESE, JR., PETITIONER

v.

PATRICIA ROBERTS HARRIS,
SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENT IN OPPOSITION

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether disclosure of information regarding petitioner's work history, which was contained in a "system of records" not relied upon as the source of the information, falls within the scope of the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. 552a.

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OPINIONS BELOW

The order of the court of appeals (Pet. App. A) is reported at 620 F.2d 298. The opinion of the district court (Pet. Supp. App. 1–16) is reported at 479 F. Supp. 304.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on June 17, 1980. The petition for a writ of certiorari was filed on September 15, 1980. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

STATEMENT

Petitioner, a medical doctor, was a commissioned officer in the United States Public Health Service, Department of Health and Human Services, until his appointment was terminated in mid-summer 1977. During petitioner's duty period, his superior officer was Dr. George A. Reich, Regional Health Administrator for Region IV in Atlanta. The controversy in this case concerns a telephone conversation between Dr. Reich and petitioner's then-prospective employer disclosing petitioner's unfavorable employment record and a subsequent letter memorializing that telephone conversation.

1. In 1976, when petitioner was stationed at a Health Service clinic in South Carolina, a disagreement arose between petitioner and his supervisors concerning petitioner's alleged absences from his duty station and his conduct of an off-duty medical practice without proper authorization (Pet. Supp. App. 2; Reich Aff. 2).[1] Efforts were made by Dr. Reich and other officials to accommodate petitioner, but he con-

[1] "Reich Aff." refers to the affidavit filed by Dr. Reich in the district court.

tinued to have problems reporting for duty at the required times and places (Reich Aff., Exh. R). In July 1976, petitioner agreed to be transferred from the South Carolina clinic to a public health facility in Tchula, Mississippi. However, petitioner absented himself without leave from the South Carolina clinic prior to receiving his transfer orders to Mississippi (Reich Aff., Exh. W). A declaration to that effect appears in the central records of the Public Health Service in Rockville, Maryland (Pet. Supp. App. 3). A week later, when petitioner reported to the clinic, his absence without leave was terminated and he was restored to duty. It has been petitioner's position throughout this litigation that he was never absent without leave (AWOL) (Pet. Supp. App. 3). While stationed at the Mississippi clinic, petitioner continued to have problems reporting to work on time. Additionally, his Variable Incentive Pay Agreement was cancelled as a result of the serious deterioration of his professional performance (Reich Aff. 4).

In the fall of 1976, petitioner wrote to Dr. Reich, objecting to his having been reported AWOL. After reviewing all pertinent documents and talking to petitioner's immediate supervisors, Dr. Reich determined that the records surrounding the reported AWOL were accurate and so advised petitioner. Dr. Reich also admonished petitioner to improve his attitude and to change his unwillingness to abide by the rules and regulations governing the conduct of a commissioned officer (Reich Aff., Exh. CC).

In early 1977, petitioner was transferred from Tchula, Mississippi, to a clinic in MacClenny, Florida, where he remained until his termination as a commissioned officer. Following the termination, Dr. Reich was contacted by officials of the Department of Family Medicine at the East Carolina Medical School, who requested a job reference regarding petitioner. Sub-

sequently, Dr. Reich, during a telephone conversation, indicated the prolonged negative experience he had had concerning petitioner's obedience to rules and regulations. Dr. Reich further stated that petitioner was AWOL on one occasion (Pet. Supp. App. 4). Pursuant to the medical school's request, Dr. Reich sent a brief letter memorializing this job recommendation (Pet. App. B). That letter was subsequently placed in Dr. Reich's reading file and a regional programmatic file (Pet. Supp. App. 9). No copy of the letter was ever placed in petitioner's personnel file maintained at the headquarters of the Public Health Service in Rockville. The offer of employment issued by the medical school to petitioner was later withdrawn because of various misrepresentations in petitioner's application (Reich Aff., Exh. II).

2. On February 14, 1978, petitioner brought this action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia against the Department of Health and Human Services and Dr. Reich, seeking injunctive relief and damages for defamation and violation of the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. 552a. The complaint alleged that certain information contained in the records of the Public Health Service is "inaccurate, incomplete, false, and misleading" (Count I); that the Department, through Dr. Reich's telephone conversation and letter, improperly released information concerning petitioner from a "system of records" (Count II); and, in a pendent claim, that Dr. Reich defamed petitioner (Count III) (Pet. Supp. App. 1, 7–8). This petition for a writ of certiorari concerns only the second count.[2] As to that count, the district court granted the government's motion for summary judgment, holding that the disclosures by Dr. Reich fell outside the scope of the Privacy Act (*id.* at 1–16).

[2]On September 27, 1979, the district court denied the government's motion for summary judgment on Count I, finding

The district court concluded that because Dr. Reich's letter to the medical school was not itself a record contained in a "system of records," as defined by the Privacy Act, the sending of the letter, standing alone, did not violate the Act. The court also concluded that Dr. Reich's disclosures of the AWOL information in the letter and the earlier telephone conversation did not violate the Act because, although that material was also contained in the "system of records" maintained by the Department in Rockville, the information included in the letter and telephone call "simply did not emanate" from the filing system in Rockville; instead, it was "based on knowledge obtained from other Public Health Service employees working with [petitioner]" (Pet. Supp. App. 14, 10). In the latter connection, the court noted that for a disclosure to be barred by the Privacy Act, "there must have initially been a retrieval from the system of records which was at some point a source of the information" (*id.* at 13).

The court of appeals affirmed by memorandum order (Pet. App. A).

ARGUMENT

The lower courts correctly concluded that the disclosures in this case were not governed by the Privacy Act. There is no conflict of decisions on the legal issues presented, and further review by this Court is unwarranted.

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that a genuine issue of material fact remained to be resolved. The court granted Dr. Reich's motion for summary judgment on Count III (Pet. Supp. App. 15–16), and no appeal was taken from that order. Subsequently, petitoner filed a motion for entry of judgment on Count II. The parties then entered into a stipulation to dismiss Count I, which was approved under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(ii). The district court thereafter entered final judgment in favor of the government, because the only remaining issue, under Count II, had already been resolved in favor of the government.

The Privacy Act provides that "[n]o agency shall disclose any record which is contained in a system of records * * * except * * * with the prior written consent of the individual to whom the record pertains * * *." 5 U.S.C. 552a(b). A "record" is defined to mean "any item, collection, or grouping of information about an individual that is maintained by an agency." 5 U.S.C. 552a(a)(4). A "system of records" is defined to mean "a group of any records under the control of any agency from which information is retrieved by the name of the individual or by some identifying number, symbol, or other identifying particular assigned to the individual." 5 U.S.C. 552a(a)(5). Therefore, unless an item of information about a person is contained in a "system of records" maintained by the agency, prior permission to disclose that information is not required under the Act.

The only "system of records" involved here was petitioner's personnel file maintained at the Public Health Service's central office in Rockville, Maryland. It is undisputed that Dr. Reich's letter to the East Carolina Medical School was not integrated into that filing system. The letter was placed only in Dr. Reich's reading file, which is maintained by sequential dates of the letters therein, and in the regional programmatic files, which are organized by subject matter. Because information is not retrieved from either file by use of an individual's "name" or "other identifying particular" assigned to him, neither file is a "system of records" within the meaning of the Act. 5 U.S.C. 552a(a)(5). Thus, disclosure of Dr. Reich's letter itself was not governed by the strictures of the Privacy Act, because that document was not contained in a "system of records" within the meaning of the Act. Cf. *Smiertka* v. *United States Dep't of Treasury*, 447 F. Supp. 221, 228–229 (D.D.C. 1978), remanded, 604 F.2d 698 (D.C. Cir. 1979).

Nor was the Privacy Act violated by disclosure of the information contained in the letter or the preceding telephone conversation. Dr. Reich did not have custody of the system of records in Rockville in which the AWOL information was contained. Although he knew of petitioner's work history, he did not prepare the document that was placed in petitioner's personnel file. The district court further found (Pet. Supp. App. 15) that Dr. Reich had no knowledge of the precise contents of petitioner's personnel file. Thus, there is no indication in the record that the information disclosed in the telephone conversation and subsequent letter was drawn from a system of records.

Petitioner argues, however (Pet. 11), that the district court erred in holding that the Privacy Act's prohibition against disclosure applies only to information that first was retrieved from a system of records. According to petitioner, where the information to be disclosed also happens to be contained in a system of records maintained by the agency and the agency employee responsible for the disclosure knows (or should know) that it is contained in the system,[3] the Privacy Act's prohibition against disclosure applies even though the employee does not rely on the system of records as the *source* of the information. This argument was properly rejected by the courts below.

The Privacy Act does not proscribe the disclosure of information, as such; it proscribes the disclosure of "any *record* which is contained in a system of *records*," without the individual's consent. 5 U.S.C. 552a(b) (emphasis added). Use of the term "record" demonstrates that the disclosure must be from the system of which the released record is a part.

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[3] Petitioner maintains (Pet. 13–17) that Dr. Reich knew that the AWOL information was contained in petitioner's personnel file in Rockville, but the district court found (Pet. Supp. App. 15) that Dr. Reich did not know the precise contents of that file.

In addition, the Privacy Act defines the term "system of records" as a collection of records from which information "is retrieved" by the name of the person or other identifying symbol. 5 U.S.C. 552a(a)(5). This, too, indicates that it is the retrieval of information from the system and its subsequent disclosure to which the prohibition in 5 U.S.C. 552a(b) is addressed. Therefore, mere incorporation of personal information into a system of records, without subsequent retrieval, will not invoke application of the statutory proscription against disclosure.

The guidelines implementing the Privacy Act, issued by the Office of Management and Budget in 1975, also support the district court's holding. They provide that a disclosure subject to 5 U.S.C. 552a(b) "may be either the transfer of a record or the granting of access to a record." 40 Fed. Reg. 28953. Use of the term "transfer" and "access," as well as "record," suggests that the disclosure must be from the system of records.

Finally, as stated in Congress' findings in the Privacy Act itself, the statute is principally concerned with protection of the privacy of persons from the government's use of sophisticated information systems, which have "greatly magnified the harm to individual privacy" by their collection and disclosure of personal information. Pub. L. No. 93-579, Section 2(a)(2), 88 Stat. 1896. The congressional findings further note "the opportunities for an individual to secure employment, insurance, and credit, and his right to due process, and other legal protections are endangered *by the misuse of certain information systems.*" Section 2(a)(3) (emphasis added). Dr. Reich based his job reference letter on his personal knowledge and on communications with other officials in the Public Health Service—the sources on which employers everywhere rely in such matters—not on retrievals from a sophisti-

cated information system. And there is no suggestion that he "misused" any information system.[4]

Petitioner's suggested test—"whether the person responsible for the disclosure knew or should have known that he was imparting information contained in agency records" (Pet. 18), whether or not the person actually obtained the information from the system—would place an unrealistic burden on the government. As noted by the district court (Pet. Supp. App. 12), federal officials are called on daily to make numerous statements concerning persons who might have personal information contained in a system of records somewhere within the agency. Congress could not have intended such officials to have a "pansophic recall concerning every record within every system of records within" their agency (*ibid.*).

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted.

WADE H. MCCREE, JR.
Solicitor General

DECEMBER 1980

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[4] In the Questions Presented (Pet. I), petitioner appears to challenge the district court's finding that Dr. Reich did not retrieve information from the Public Health Service's system of records. He does not argue this point in the body of the petition, however. In any event, there is evidence in the record that Dr. Reich relied on personal knowledge of petitioner's work record and the knowledge of other officials who communicated with Dr. Reich (Reich Aff. 6). This evidence was uncontradicted by petitioner (Pet. Supp. App. 10).

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